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Abstract.  In  the  target  article  Hutto  and  Satne  propose  a  new approach  to  studying  mental  content.
Although I believe there is much to commend in their proposal, I argue that it makes no space for a kind of
content that is of central importance to cognitive science, and which need not be involved in beliefs and
desires: what I call 'representational content'. Neglecting representational content leads to an undue limitation
of the contribution that the neo-Cartesian approach can offer to the naturalising content project. I claim that
neo-Cartesians can, on the one hand, help account for the nature of representational content and clarify what
makes  representational  states  contentful.  On  the  other,  besides  explaining  the  natural  origins  of  Ur-
intentionality, neo-Cartesians should also take the role of accounting for the natural origins of contentful
states that fall  short of beliefs and desires.  Finally, I argue that the only alternative for the authors is to
embrace  some  form of  non-representationalism,  as  Hutto  elsewhere  does.  The  success  of  the  proposal
thereby turns on the fate of the radical non-representationalist position that it accompanies.








posit   in   the   cognitive   sciences   and   in   the   philosophy   of  mind,   still   lacks   a   fully
satisfactory treatment whereby to establish its proper place in the natural order. The
main contenders at providing such a treatment make use of fundamentally different
strategies:   some   try   to  provide   a   reductive   account   of  mental   content,   explaining
content  as  being  based  on some natural   relation;  others,  non­reductive   in  nature,
attempt to explain mental content by either appealing to ascription and stances or to





















work,   as   things   stand.  Rather,   I   shall   focus  on   their  positive  proposal   for  a  new
framework in which to couch research on content. 
The   central   piece   of   the   general   diagnosis,   though,   works   also   as   the   basic
assumption   on  which  Hutto   and  Satne   ground   the   framework   they   propose.   The
“offending   assumption”,   as   they   call   it,   is   to   equate   intentionality   with   having
semantic   content.  This   assumption   is   said   to   be  behind   the   failures   of   the   three
traditional   strategies,   and   it   is   the   rejection   of   this   assumption   that   allows   the
authors' alternative proposal to take off2. 
In what follows, I will examine this central assumption and, in particular, how to
1 One position that has been gaining ground in recent years and which is not included among the
main contenders is the 'phenomenal intentionality' view (see e.g. Horgan and Tienson 2002). 
2 Although only partially so. See below.
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Hutto   elsewhere   advocates   (Hutto   and   Myin   2013a),   and   embrace   the   Radical
Enactivism   therein   proposed,   the   worries   I   present   below   lose   their   force.   This
suggests that the framework proposed by Hutto and Satne requires not only that the
“offending assumption” be rejected, but also that Radical Enactivism be embraced. The
success   of   their   proposal   thereby   turns   on   the   fate   of   the   radical   non­
representationalist position that it naturally accompanies.







These   two  ways  may be  more  or   less   related,  depending on  the  overall   theory  of
cognition in which they are embedded. The distinction to which I refer here is that















To   cite   an   example   (Colombo  mentions  Jerry  Fodor  and  Tim  Crane),   take  Burge
(2010). He defines the term “representation” as meaning “any sort of intentionality in
perception, cognition, or language”4, and further on he claims that “even now, accounts
of   representation   ('intentionality')   swing   from   approaches   that   insist   that
representation is the special achievement of reflective human beings or language users
to  approaches   that  maintain   that   representation   is   as   common  as   causally  based
3 Similarly, Ramsey (2007), p. 18: “there seems to be a tacit assumption held by many philosophers
that a theory of intentionality just is a theory of representation”.




















the broader sense (aboutness):  states with intentional  content,  such as beliefs and
desires;  states with representational  content short  of  beliefs and desires; and non­
contentful   states   that   have   the   directedness   of   Ur­intentionality.   However,
occasionally the term 'intentionality' is used more restrictedly to describe a property
only of mental states such as beliefs and desires.





5 Burge (2010), p. 432.
6 Cummins (1996), p. 16.
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justify actions (Cash 2009).




type of content that  lies at  the subpersonal   level  and does not   involve full­fledged








about  how the  visual  system extracts  shape   from shading  is  actually  a
theory   about   how   we   convert   representations   of   shading   into
representations  of   shape.  The  same general  point  holds   for  most   of   the
explananda of cognitive science. Indeed, this is one of the legitimate senses
in   which   cognitive   systems   can   be   viewed   as   doing   something   called
“information   processing”.  While   automobile   engines   transform   fuel   and
oxygen into a spinning drive­shaft, and coffee­makers convert ground coffee
to  liquid coffee,  cognitive systems transform representational  states  into
different representational states. (Ramsey, 2007, p. 69)






7 See Cash (2009), in which this attempt is made but, I believe, in a way that does not do away with
eliminativist worries. An ascriptionist strategy is hypothesised also by Fenici (2013). Of course, if
one embraces non-representationalism about those cognitive mechanisms, this may not seem to be a





concede   much   space   to   the   neo­pragmatist   strategy,   we   will   still   leave   out   a
considerable   range   of   cognitive   phenomena   that   call   for   explanation   in




These   considerations   do  not   of   course   threaten   the  neo­pragmatist   account   of
intentional   content,   but   only   of   representational   content   in   general,   as   we   are
understanding these terms herein. 
Hutto   and   Satne   might   be   working   with   this   more   restricted   notion   of




of   that  enterprise,   they  quote  Rosenberg   (2013,  p.  3),  who   claims   that   “the  basic
problem that intentionality raises for naturalism ... [is] how can a clump of matter, for
example, the brain or some proper part of it, have  propositional  content9,  be  about
some other thing in the universe”. Unless we take this claim to be referring to the
narrower notion of intentionality mentioned above, the claim is too strong10. For there
is   no   need   that   representational   content   be   propositional.   In  most   cases,   on   the
contrary, it will be non­conceptual and non­propositional11. It is, for instance, hard to
abilities can be explained with no recourse to representations. See the section 'Concluding Remarks'
below. 
8 Though they probably are  not,  and would rather  endorse non-representationalism,  thus  doing
away with what I have been calling here representational content. See below. 
9 Emphasis added.
10 Alternatively, if the project of naturalising intentionality is thus formulated and taken to cover all
forms of intentionality, it opens itself to the charge of overintellectualism (Hutto and Myin, 2013a,
chap. 5). 
11 Burge (2010, pp. 36, 104), for instance, argues that perceptual content is not propositional even
though we explain it propositionally.
7
see without considerable stretch how a spatial map in rat hippocampus can be said to
have   propositional   content12.   However,   it   can   be   said,   on   most   accounts   of
representation at least, that it represents the spatial layout of a certain region.
What   I  would   like  here   to  put   forward   is   that   the  neo­Cartesian  attempts  at
reducing content, if targeted at representational content and not at the contents of
beliefs  and desires,  contra  Fodor   (1975),   can actually  succeed.  Perhaps  Hutto  and
Satne  are  correct   in   their  diagnosis   that  neo­Cartesians  are   trying   to  account   for
content  at   the wrong  level.  Nevertheless,   that  does not  mean that they should be
relegated  solely   to   explaining  non­contentful  mechanisms  and  states,   or  what   the
authors call Ur­intentionality. There is a whole domain of explanation between that of
intentional states understood as beliefs and desires and non­contentful states, namely
that  of   representational   (vs.   intentional)   content.  Neo­Cartesianism can  thus  have




cards   in   their   hands   that  may   not   be   liable   to   the   crippling   objections   against
teleological   theories   of   content,   at   least   when   left   unsupplemented.  When
representational content in the aforementioned sense comes to be dissociated from the
contents   of   intentional   states,  many   requirements   that   intentional   content  must




attempts   to   reduce   content,   is   to   be   seen.  At   any   rate,   given   that   the   stringent
requirements on a theory of intentional content may not apply, the endeavour does not
seem hopeless. 
Neo­Cartesianism seems  appropriate  at   least   for   representational   content   that
12 See Rescorla (2009).
13 As in Cummins (1996).




appears   to  be  no  space   for   this   type of   content.   Indeed,  either  we  make  the  neo­
pragmatists offer an account of representational content thus understood, which I take


















15 And neither can the ascriptionism of neo-behaviourists, at least if we want to keep to a realist
understanding of representation.
16 That is the line followed by Hutto and Myin (2013a).
17 Even though some talk of representation in the cognitive sciences may be misleading, as Ramsey
(2007) argues at length. But see Shagrir (2012) for a reply that considerably downsizes Ramsey's
point.  Burge  (2010,  chap.  8)  also  argues  against  what  he  calls  “deflationary”  theories  of
representation, while Hutto and Myin (2013a, pp. 120ff.) adopt a thoroughly non-representational
view and contend that the cognitive sciences do not need to posit representations in most cases. See
below.
9










general.   For   it   has   been   common   in   the   literature   on   representation   to   regard
primitive kinds of sensitivity to the environment as contentful in light of theories that
have “under­reduced” representation, that is to say, that have defined representation
in a  way that   is  excessively  weak19.  As  a  consequence,  neo­Cartesians  have  found
themselves   debating   what   the   representational   content   of   magnetosomes   in
magnectotatic  bacteria should be.  I  agree with the authors (and with Ramsey and
Burge) that this kind of strategy is misguided. Talk of content, in these cases, does not
grab a hold and is explanatorily unhelpful. Magnetotactic bacteria do not represent
anything   but,   rather,   have   evolved   to   respond   in   a   certain   way   to   certain
environmental stimuli  courtesy of the sensitiveness of their magnetosomes. In this
case, there is what Hutto and Satne call Ur­intentionality, but there is no such a thing
as  representational  or   intentional  content.  Magnetosomes have allowed bacteria  to





18 See n. 7 in the target article.
19 See Ramsey (2007), chap. 1.
20 See also Cummins (1996), p. 45 and Burge (2010), pp. 300ff. and passim.
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numerous   phenomena   that   are   not,   even   remotely,   distinctively
psychological.   From   an   explanatory   point   of   view,   the   term   could   be
dropped in favour of other notions, notions of sensitivity or discrimination,
or co variation, or causal co variation, or structurally isomorphic causal co‐ ‐ ‐
variation,  or   information carrying—together with the  notion of  biological‐
function. (Burge 2010, p. 294)
While   I   endorse   Burge's   suggestion   not   to   under­reduce   representation   and
representational content in a way that makes the notions fail to be psychologically
















21 And if I understand the authors correctly, determining the boundaries of this distinction should
be the privilege of neo-behaviourists. It is not clear to me, though, that the proposed distinction
between intentional agents and intentional patients succeeds in advancing matters. In particular, it
seems to me that intentional patients, such as animals and infants, end up having contentful states in
11
Moreover, as Hutto and Satne rightly point out, the explanatory task does not stop









previous   section,   the   distinction   between   intentionality   and  Ur­intentionality   that
Hutto and Satne draw is not fine­grained enough. For recall that they rely mainly on
the neo­pragmatist strategy in order to account for content­involving intentionality. By
doing   so,   they  must   commit   themselves   to   the   implausible   view   that  non­human
animals, or at least asocial non­human animals, as well as humans socially isolated




important   shortcomings  of   the  neo­pragmatist   strategy   is   still   to   be   found   in   the
framework proposed by Hutto and Satne. In other words, there is a lot in the 'content
spectrum'   between   the   non­contentful   “response   tendencies”   typical   of   Ur­
intentionality, and beliefs and desires possibly grounded on social practices typical of
intentionality (narrowly understood).
Perceptual   states,   for   instance,   are  plausible   candidates   for   contentful  mental
states which are not dependent on social practices for their contents and that thus
should   inhabit   the  middle   ground22.   There   is   every   reason   to   believe   that  many
'merely' ascriptionist fashion (see Shea 2013, pp. 498-9).
22 Hutto and Myin (2013a, chap. 6) defend the view that perception is non-representational. How
perceptual abilities, as well as the aspectual nature of perception, could be accounted for without









and how they exploited constancies   in sensory  input to produce representations of
entities and properties in the environment. Natural selection can provide an account of
the origins  of   content  as  much as  of   the  origins  of  environmental  sensitivity.  For
natural   selection   can   explain   how   organisms   became   capable   of   informing   their








these   cognitive   maps   do   not   feature   intentional   content,   they   have   correctness
conditions and thus representational content. Whether and to what extent non­human
animals have cognitive maps that represent spatial properties of their environments is
still   a  matter   of   some   controversy24.   At   any   rate,   cognitive  maps   in   non­human
animals,   if   they  exist,  are  another  example  of   contentful  mental  state   that   is  not
dependent on social practices.
Thus, insofar as we are concerned with the natural origins question, I suggest that
neo­Cartesians   can   and   should   do   more   than   explain   Ur­intentionality.   Their
contribution can go at least to the level of representational contents that fall short of
23 Hutto  and  Myin  ( ibid.)  reject  Burge's  claim  that  perceiving  constancies  is  sufficient  for
warranting talk of representational content. 

















that   are   arguably  neither   conceptual   nor   propositional,   but,   rather,  we  would   be
tackling   representations  with   conceptual   content,   both   in  humans  and  non­verbal






certainty  about  how correct   the  core   cognition   thesis  actually   is   (though  a   rather




25 See, for instance, Carey (2009).






















proposed   by   Hutto   and   Satne   should   be   somewhat   modified.   The   notions   of
intentionality and Ur­intentionality seem to be insufficient to cover the whole ground.
We need something more: an intermediate notion of representational content. As a






of  accounting   for   the  natural   origins  of   contentful   states   that   fall   short   from the
complexities of beliefs and desires. 
But, it may be objected, the foregoing considerations are clearly wedded to the
mainstream   paradigm   in   the   cognitive   sciences   according   to   which   cognitive
phenomena largely involve representations. It is when put against the background of




they   call   Radical   Enactivism,   according   to  which   “our  most   elementary  ways   of
engaging with the world and others –  including our basic  forms of  perception and
perceptual experience – are mindful in the sense of being phenomenally charged and















theories  of  content,  especially  those that base themselves on informational content
27 Hutto and Myin (2013a), p. 13.









coping   with   the   environment,   as   for   instance   perception,   memory,   recognition,
planning,  mental   imagery,   learning.   If  Radical  Enactivism  is   to  become a   serious
contender   in   the   explaining   cognition   game,   it   must   provide   accounts   of   such
phenomena that rival in cogency their representationalist counterparts. And note that








place   of   intentionality   in   the   natural   order   is   to   be   left   unchanged,   accepting   it
requires accepting the radical, and as of now, not sufficiently detailed picture of Hutto






29 For criticism of the attacks launched in Hutto and Myin (2013a) against existing theories of
content, see the reviews by Matthen (2014) and Campbell (2014).
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